Question the Astonishing Hypothesis

“You, your joys and sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” Thus spoke Francis Crick on consciousness. Pretty crazy, huh? No wonder this claim is known as the Astonishing Hypothesis. Do you think it’s true? I think Crick’s hypothesis reflects a common misjudgment of science’s role in discovering truth, which I want to correct here.

I heard from some first-year friends that they were learning about the Astonishing Hypothesis in Frontiers of Science. Although it has been three years since I took Frontiers, the hypothesis is one thing I remember mentioned in the Mind, Brain, and Behavior section of the course. Though not discussed during Frontiers, many questions about the nature of science and truth are raised by Crick’s hypothesis. What does it mean for our free will, ambitions, and emotions to be “no more than” the physical activity of the neurons in our brain? Is this what we should call “the soul,” or is any notion of the soul nonsense? What questions can science even answer? This further raises the following question—is science the only valid method of finding truth?

Roughly speaking, science is the pursuit of understanding of the world by making empirically testable predictions and seeing which predictions hold up under scrutiny. Because of the widespread practical success of science, many scientists, philosophers, and members of the general public tend to place science on a pedestal as a privileged method of discovering truth. Some even suggest that science can and will be able to answer everything, and that anything it cannot address does not exist or is meaningless. Science is thus equated with rational thought, and other “nonscientific” modes of thinking are automatically relegated to the category of “irrational thought” or relativism. These claims are the basis for what’s commonly called scientism.

I see a problem with these claims. The definition of empirical testability leaves out a large number of valid truths about the world. Science itself is built on philosophical foundations that cannot be empirically tested. For example, take the word “cause.” What is it that constitutes a “cause”? One quickly encounters a problem when trying to empirically test this question. Any empirical observation or interpretation of an observation necessarily presupposes what a cause is. Thus, using empirical testing to demonstrate what a cause is would be arguing in a circle, which is a logical no-no.

Someone would respond, “Fine. Philosophy, after all, used to be called ‘the highest science’ by ancient and medieval scholars, so I’ll expand the definition of science to include philosophy.” This also becomes a problem, though, since the original goal of setting science apart as uniquely rational and valid was to exclude religion and theology, fields that deal with a nonmaterial realm. Also, the same people who called philosophy “the highest science” also considered theology to be “the highest subject,” above all other branches of philosophy. There are legitimate—though debatable—arguments within philosophy that argue for God’s existence. One example would be Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’ arguments for an “uncaused cause.” Do you see the problem? Any definition of science that includes philosophy must also include theology.

I’ve outlined here why I think scientism is wrong, and you may disagree with me, but that’s my hope here—to spark debate about this topic. The interface between science and religion is one of the deepest issues facing modern society, and how that conflict is resolved will profoundly impact all of us. I simply want this piece to inspire you to think about these questions yourselves.

So, how about it? Do you agree or disagree with me? Let’s discuss.

The author is a Columbia College senior majoring in biology. He is a discussion group leader for the Veritas Forum.